An ID-based encryption (IBE) is a public key cryptosystem, in which a user's public key is given as a user ID. In IBE, only a single center generates all user secret keys, which may give the center a load of burdensome work. A hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) is a kind of IBE and overcomes the problem by delegating a user secret key generation to a lower-level center, in which centers form a hierarchical structure. However, all ancestor nodes in HIBE act as centers. That is, any ancestor as well as the root can generate a secret key for any descendant node and, thus, a cipher text to a node can be decrypted by any ancestor node even if the ancestor does not have the same secret key as that of a target node. In this paper, we propose the concept of ancestor-excludable HIBE, in which ancestors with a level less than the designated one can be excluded from a set of privileged ancestors with a right to decrypt a cipher text to a target node. We also give the functional definition together with the security definition. This notion is denoted by AE-HIBE simply. We present the concrete example of AE-HIBE, which can work with constant-size ciphertext and decryption time, independent of the hierarchy level. We prove that our AE-HIBE is selective-ID-CPA secure in the standard model, which can be converted to be selective-ID-CCA secure by applying a general conversion method. Furthermore, AE-HIBE can be naturally applied to the broadcast encryption to realize the efficient public-key version with the user-key size of O(log 2 N ) and the transmission rate of O(r) for N users and r revoked users. The user-key size is the smallest at the transmission rate of O(r), up to the present.
Introduction
IBE and HIBE. An ID-based encryption (IBE) is a public key cryptosystem, in which a user's public key is given as a user ID such as an email address or name and the corresponding secret key is computed by a center. In IBE, we don't have to use any certification for public keys. A concrete and provable secure IBE is proposed 3) . In IBE, only a single center generates all user secret keys, which may give the center a load of burdensome work. A hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) is a kind of IBE and overcomes the problem by delegating a user secret key generation to a lower-level center: any user is assigned to a node of a tree except the root; the identity of a user v is an ID-tuple v = v 1 · · · v l−1 v l , which represents all ancestors information; and the corresponding user secret key SK v is generated from its parent v 1 · · · v l−1 . Therefore, we could say that HIBE represents ID hierarchically. However, all ancestor nodes act as centers. That is, any ancestor as well as root can generate a secret key for any descendant node and, thus, a cipher text to a node can be decrypted by any ancestor node even if the ancestor does not have the same se- † Japan Advanced Institute Science and Technology cret key as that of a target node. The feature of ID. To make the feature of ID clear, let us think about what information can identify a person from among others and what structure a user's identification data has. Let us think about the example of postal mail. In order to identify a person as Alice, we put a country name, a prefecture or state name, a city name, a street name, and a house number as well as her name. In the case of an e-mail, the information of an e-mail often consists of a country name, an organization name, and a department name as well as a user name such as Alice@computer-science.A-univ.edu. These examples indicate that ID itself forms a hierarchical structure. The hierarchical structure exists quite naturally in a variety of organizations, such as companies, governments and/or schools. We also see a rather relaxed hierarchical structure in a consortium of corporations that engage in governmental projects or joint ventures. In such a consortium, one company would be a leader and other companies would work in a part of the business as its sections, branches, or subsidiaries. Thus, such a consor-tium forms a hierarchical structure, but at the same time, each of the consortium companies is rather independent. In such a rather relaxed hierarchical structure, all upper-level members do not necessarily have to control the lowerlevel members. On the other hand, in a strict hierarchical structure, the upper-level member may absolutely control the lower-level member and even disclose ciphertexts sent to the lowerlevel member in the case of necessity. Ancestor-excludable HIBE. Let us examine what features are necessary for IDs with a hierarchical structure. One feature is the expression-ability of the hierarchical structure of the ID, which can be achieved in HIBE but cannot be achieved in IBE. Another feature is the ancestor-excludable feature: ancestors with a level less than the designated one can be excluded from a set of privileged ancestors who have the right to decrypt a cipher text to a target node. All ancestors in HIBE act as centers and, thus, the upper-level member absolutely controls the lower-level member. Therefore, HIBE can not achieve the ancestor-excludable feature.
In summary, the ancestor-excludable hierarchical ID-based encryption scheme should satisfy the following two features: the expressionability of the hierarchical structure of ID and the ancestor-excludable feature. IBE deals with ID at the same level, that is, it can neither express the hierarchical structure of ID nor realize the ancestor-excludable feature. On the other hand, HIBE can express the hierarchical structure of ID but cannot achieve the ancestorexcludable feature. We may note that the ancestor-excludable feature works well under the strict hierarchical structure as well as the relaxed hierarchical structure. Our contribution. We propose the new concept of ancestor-excludable hierarchical IDbased encryption scheme, denoted by AE-HIBE for simplicity, and give the functional definition together with the security definition. We also give a concrete example of AE-HIBE, which is based on a HIBE 1) . Our AE-HIBE of the hierarchy level t can work with the constant-size ciphertext and decryption cost that is independent of t, and the user-key size of O(t). Our AE-HIBE has proven to be selective-ID-CPAsecure in the standard model by introducing an injection map.
As an important application, our AE-HIBE improves the public-key subset difference broadcast encryption 6) in the user-key size at no expense of the transmission rate, which cannot be achieved in the HIBE paradigm. The subset difference broadcast encryption (SD) has an advantage of the transmission rate at the expense of user-key size, which is originally based on a symmetric key 10) . LSD broadcast encryption (LSD) 8) has further reduced the user-key size of SD at the slight expense of the transmission rate. HIBE translates the symmetric-key SD (resp. LSD) to the public-key one faithfully 6) and, thus, the user-key size is O(|SK HIBE | log 2 N ) (resp.
where N is the number of users; and |SK HIBE | is the node-secretkey size in HIBE. Therefore, even if the most efficient HIBE (random-oracle model) 1) with |SK HIBE | = O(log N ) for the hierarchy level log N is applied, the user-key size of public-key SD (resp. LSD) becomes O(log 3 N ) (resp. O(log 5/2 N )). On the other hand, the ancestor-excludable feature of AE-HIBE can exactly reduce the user-key size by realizing another feature of SD. In fact, the user-key size in the public-key SD based on AE-HIBE is O(|SK AE-HIBE | log N ), where |SK AE-HIBE | is the node-secret-key size in AE-HIBE. As a result, the public-key SD based on our AE-HIBE can work with the user-key size of O(log 2 N ), which is the smallest at no expense of the transmission rate, up to the present. See Table 1 for the comparison. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the basic notions. Section 3 gives the functional definition of AE-HIBE and the security definition. Section 4 presents a concrete example together with the security proof. Finally, Section 5 applies our AE-HIBE to the broadcast encryption and presents an efficient public-key broadcast encryption.
Preliminary
This section summarizes the basic notions and HIBE.
The Bilinear Map and Its Related
Assumption Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of prime
The number of keys that a user has to possess is O(log 2 N ) (resp. O(log 3/2 N )), where the size of a key is O(log N ). So the total user-key size becomes O(log 3 N ) (resp. O(log 5/2 N )). The number of keys that a user has to possess is O(log N ), where the size of a key is O(log N ). So the total user-key size becomes O(log 2 N ). Table 1 Comparison of public-key broadcast encryption with N users and r revoked users.
The public-key size can be reduced, while maintaining |public key| × |transmission rate| = O(N ). ‡ : The public-key sizes can be made constant size under the random oracle model. order q. G 1 (resp. G 2 ) is represented additively (resp. multiplicatively), where O (resp. 1) represents the zero element (identity element) for addition (multiplication) in G 1 (resp. G 2 ). The following bilinear mapê :
There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P 0 , P 1 ) for any P 0 , P 1 ∈ G 1 . Let k be a security parameter. A BDHE (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent) parameter generator IG is a probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) algorithm that on input 1 k , outputs a description of the above (G 1 , G 2 ,ê). The computational -BDHE problem with respect to IG is to computeê(P, R) α from random P, R and
is an output of IG. If this problem is hard, then we say that IG satisfies the computational -BDHE assumption. More precisely, we say that IG satisfies the computational -BDHE assumption if the following probability is negligible (in k) for all ppt algorithms A:
where
The decisional version is defined in the usual manner: given random P, R, α i P ∈ G 1 and T ∈ G 2 (where i = 1, · · · , − 1, + 1, · · · , 2 ), decide whether T = e(P, R) α or not. More precisely, we say that IG satisfies the decisional -BDHE assumption if the following is negligible (in k) for all ppt algorithms A:
This method is not based on SD or LSD.
Pr
These assumption are believed to hold ifê is Weil/Tate pairing on supersingular elliptic curves or some ordinary elliptic curves 9) . 
ID-based Encryption and Hierarchical ID-based Encryption
. A secret-key of the identity v, denoted by SK v , is issued by its parent (that is v| l−1 ). IBE can be considered for the case in which all identities are in level 1 of HIBE (See Fig. 1) . The formal definition of IBE or HIBE is summarized in Annex A.1 or A.2, respectively.
Ancestor-Excludable Hierarchical ID-based Encryption
This section defines the ancestor-excludable hierarchical ID-based encryption (AE-HIBE). AE-HIBE is the intermediate notion between IBE and HIBE, which achieves a new feature, the ancestor-excludable feature.
3.1 Comparisons between IBE, HIBE, and AE-HIBE Let us discuss the differences between IBE, HIBE, and AE-HIBE to clarify an issue to be settled. Figures 1 and 2 show the relation between centers and users in IBE and HIBE, re- spectively. In IBE, there exists only one center that generates all secret keys for all users. So IBE deals with users at the same level. On the other hand, centers form a hierarchical structure in HIBE. Therefore, HIBE represents the ID hierarchically. This feature is called the expression-ability of the hierarchical structure of IDs in this paper.
The hierarchical structure exists quite naturally in various organizations such as companies, governments and/or schools, where the ID itself often forms a hierarchical structure. Our purpose is to construct the ID-based encryption scheme fit for IDs with a hierarchical structure. Let us consider the following situation in Fig. 3 : Alice works in the D factory of A company; Bob works in the DVD department of C software company under A company. C software company has been recently absorbed by A company. To identify Alice among others, we need all hierarchical information of (A company, D factory, Alice) as well as her name, Alice. As we mentioned above, IBE is not suitable for this case. Let us apply HIBE (see Fig. 2 ) to this situation: the root center generates the secret keys for A company and B company, the president of A company generates the secret keys for D factory and C software company, and the manager of D factory generates the secret key for Alice, and so on. HIBE seems to deal with the hierarchical structure and represents the hierarchical structure of the ID. However, all nodes except leaves in HIBE act as centers, so a cipher text to Alice can be decrypted by both the manager of D factory and the president of A company as well as the root center. In a strict hierarchical structure, the upper-level member may be allowed to disclose ciphertexts to the lower-level member if necessity, however, in a rather relaxed hierarchical structure, no upper-level member necessarily has to control the lower level. In the case of Bob, C software company has been recently absorbed by A company. So, C software company is in the position under A company, but at the same time, is rather independent of A company. In this case, only the designated upper-level member such as the managers of C software company or DVD Department is able to control the lower-level member. This feature is called the ancestor-excludable feature in this paper. The ancestor-excludable feature can also achieve the original feature of HIBE, that is the upper-level member always controls the lower-level member, by setting the level of a designated ancestor to 1.
In summary, AE-HIBE satisfies both the expression-ability of the hierarchical structure of ID and the ancestor-excludable feature. Neither HIBE nor IBE can achieve the ancestorexcludable feature.
Functional and Security Definition
This section gives the functional definition of AE-HIBE and its security definition. Let T be an m-ary tree with the level t, which represents user IDs. Let us denote a restricted set by
Definition 1 (AE-HIBE) AE-HIBE consists of a 5-tuple of ppt algorithms (KGen, KDer, KDer p , Enc, Dec), where
• KGen(1 k , t, m), the root center key-genera-tion algorithm, for input of security parameter k and the level t of m-ary tree, outputs a system public key PK and the root center's secret key SK ε .
• KDer(PK, v, SK ε ), the root center keyderivation algorithm, for input of the public key PK, a node v whose level is l, and the root secret key SK ε , outputs the node secret key of v,
, the user's key derivation algorithm, for input of the public key PK, a node v with level l, the secret key 
. Only the root center can derive all node secret keys of users.
• Enc(PK, v, h, M), the encryption algorithm, for input of the public key PK, a
h of a designated ancestor, and a message M , outputs a ciphertext C together with the user ID v and the level h.
level h of a designated ancestor, and a subset of a user secret key SK v | i , decrypts C to M .
Remark:
1. The advantage of AE-HIBE to HIBE lies in a feature of Dec. In the case of HIBE, all ancestors of v can decrypt a ciphertext. However, AE-HIBE can exclude any ancestor with a level i < h and let only ancestors with levels i ≥ h decrypt the ciphertext. Note that an ancestor with a level of i ≥ h cannot generate the whole key of SK v but SK v | i by executing KDer p . 2. Because of the above feature, the key
which cannot be structurally generated by any ancestor with the level i < h. The correctness of AE-HIBE is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Correctness) Let AE-HIBE be the ancestor-excludable HIBE in Definition 1. AE-HIBE satisfies the correctness if the following features hold. Let C be a cipher text to a target node v with the designated level h, that is C = Enc(PK, v, h, M). Then 1. Any ancestor of v with a level ≥ h can decrypt the cipher text. 2. Any ancestor of v with a level < h cannot decrypt the cipher text.
AE-HIBE is a special case of HIBE and, thus, the security definition follows mostly that of HIBE 1) , which has the decryption and the key derivation oracles. The important difference lies in the key derivation oracles. In the case of HIBE, an adversary is not allowed to ask a secret key of any node in the path ρ v ∈ T from the root to a target node v. But, in our AE-HIBE, an adversary is allowed to ask a secret key of a node w in the path ρ v until the level of w is lower than the target level. The security is defined as follows.
Definition 3 We say that an AE-HIBE scheme is IND-AE-HIBE-CCA secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext and node adversary if the advantage of any ppt adversary A against the challenger in the following experiment is negligible.
Set up The challenger takes a security parameter k and the level t of an m-ary tree and executes KGen(1 k , t, m). Then it gives A the public parameter PK and keeps the root secret key SK ε . Phase 1 A issues a number of queries q 1 , · · · , q n 1 , where query q i is one of the following:
• Node-secret-key query: On the query of a node v, output the corresponding node key SK v .
• Decryption query: On the query of a . The game is the same as IND-AE-HIBE-CCA except that the adversary A discloses to the challenger the target node v * and the level h * before the Set up phase. The Node-secret-key query follows the restrictions in Phase 2. We can also define the chosen plaintext security for an AE-HIBE scheme in the same way as IBE or HIBE 1),3), 7) , in which A is not allowed to issue any decryption query but still issues adaptive node-secret-key queries. This adversary function is termed AE-HIBE-CPA (or sAE-HIBE-CPA in the case of a selective-node adversary).
Definition 4 We say that an AE-HIBE scheme is IND-sAE-HIBE-CCA secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext and a selective-node adversary if the advantage of any ppt adversary A against the challenger in the experiment defined in Definition 3 is negligible.
Definition 5 We say that an AE-HIBE scheme is IND-AE-HIBE-CPA (resp. IND-sAE-HIBE-CPA) secure against adaptive chosen node (resp. selective-node) attacks if the advantage of any ppt adversary A against the challenger in the experiment defined in Definition 3 without decryption oracle is negligible.
Discussion
Let us investigate why we need the ancestorexcludable feature for HIBE. One of important applications of HIBE is the broadcast encryption scheme. The efficiency of broadcast encryption is measured by the transmission rate and the size of a user secret key, however, here we focus on only the size of a user secret key.
HIBE is used to realize the public-key subsetdifference broadcast encryption scheme. The subset difference broadcast encryption (SD) is originally based on a symmetric-key encryption 10) , in which users are assigned to leaves of a binary tree T of level t for |N | = N = 2 t . In SD, a set of privileged users is covered by the difference of two subsets S v,w = S v \ S w , where v, w ∈ T , v is an ancestor of w, and S v or S w is a complete subtree rooted at v or w, respectively. Figure 4 represents a set of privileged users of SD, in which privileged users are in the gray-color part and revoked users are in the colorless part. The remarkable feature of SD lies in the user key derivation methods, which enables a user key of O(log 2 N ) to generate the whole necessary decryption keys with O(N ). HIBE translates the symmetric-key SD to the public-key faithfully and, thus, the user-key size is O(|SK HIBE | log 2 N ). Therefore, even if the most efficient HIBE 1) or the limited-delegation version (see Section 4.1 in the same paper 1) ) is applied, the user-key size becomes O(log 3 N ), which is worse than the user-key size O(log 2 N ) in the symmetric-key SD.
In order to improve the user-key size, we investigate a new key-derivation method of SD. The covering method of SD satisfies the following feature, which is focused in this paper for the first time:
See Fig. 5 . The feature means that a user in S v ,v is allowed to generate a subset key K S w,v but a user in S w,v \ S v ,v is not allowed to generate a subset key K S v ,v . The ancestorexcludable feature would achieve this feature by excluding any ancestor with a level > v from users in S w,v . The above discussion will be described in detail in Section 5.
ID-based Encryption Scheme with a Hierarchical Structure
We present a concrete scheme of AE-HIBE and, then, give security proof. The secu-rity of our AE-HIBE is based on the decisional t-BDHE assumption without random oracle model, where t is the level of an m-ary tree T with the root ε. The identity of a user v is represented as an ID-
AE-HIBE Based on the BDHE Assumption
The number of nodes is
In our AE-HIBE, a message to be encrypted is in G 2 in the same way as
by using the above injection map i d .
A secret key of a user v will consist of (t + 1) group elements, denoted by
executes the following: ( 1 ) Run IG(k) to generate groups G 1 and G 2 with prime order q and bilinear map e : 
and the root secret key is
One example is a pre-order traversal. identities in Ref. 1) 
Then, it becomes a valid part of the key of vv l+1 for α vv l+1 = α v + r vv l+1 , which is unknown to user v.
Dec(SK v , C, h) executes the following: (
Both A v,h and B v in SK v is sufficient to decrypt a ciphertext C ← Enc(PK, v, h, M). Therefore, only ancestors of v with a level ≥ h can decrypt the C since no ancestor of v with a level < h has any information about sk v,h . Thus, AE-HIBE has proven to satisfy the ancestor-excludable feature as well as the expression-ability of the hierarchical structure of ID. Remark: In addition to the above two features, our AE-HIBE has another interesting feature on an addition of a new organization. Suppose that B company absorbs F software company with DVD Dept. (see Fig. 6 ) after the root center has already set up each secret key (see Fig. 3 ), where David works in the DVD Dept. In that case, the root center can easily add a new group of (F software company, DVD Dept., David) by setting them in T and executing KDer to generate each secret key. Then, the ancestor-excludable feature still holds in the new hierarchical structure if the addition satisfies the following conditions: the new structure does not break the original structure and the number of total nodes does not exceed q − 1. Note that the root center does not have to regenerate the secret keys of any user in Fig. 3 .
Security
We show that our AE-HIBE is selectiveidentity secure (IND-AE-HIBE-CPA) under the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption.
Theorem 1 If IG satisfies the (t + 1)-BDHE assumption, then AE-HIBE is IND-sAE-HIBE-CPA secure. proof: Suppose there exists a ppt adversary A which attacks the proposed AE-HIBE of an m-ary tree T with hierarchy level t with the advantage ε, where A asks Q e secret-key queries. We will show that a ppt-algorithm B exists that solves the decisional (t + 1)-BDHE problem in •
• Choose δ ∈ Z q randomly and set
where SK ε,i is unknown to B.
and sends PK to A. Phase 1: A issues a private key corresponding
To respond to the query, B derives a private key according to the following two cases.
• Case 1 u < h * : B executes the following. Note that i d (v) = 0 from the definition of i d .
• Chooseα v ∈ Z q randomly and set
All these parameters except α v are computable by B.
all of which, except SK ε,i − Y t+1 , are computable by B. The exception is computable as follows:
The restriction of private key queries ensures that
. B executes the following:
all of which, except
are computable by B. The exception is computable as follows:
. Challenge: When A decides Phase 1 is over, it outputs two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G 2 on which it wishes to be challenged. B picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with the challenge ciphertext
where R and T are the input given to B.
c . On the other hand, when T is uniform and independent in G 2 (that is, it is sampled from R BDHE ), C is independent of b in the adversary's view. When the input T is sampled from P BDHE , that is T =ê(P, R) 
It is easy to see that B simulates the environment of A perfectly. Thus, we have proved that AE-HIBE is IND-sAE-HIBE-CPA secure if IG satisfies the (t + 1)-BDHE assumption. Remark: Our AE-HIBE is based on BBG-HIBE and, thus, the proof follows mostly that of BBG-HIBE. The important difference lies in the root secret key. In our AE-HIBE, each level, including the target level h * , has each secret key. The root secret key consists of the t secret keys in total. On the other hand, there is one secret key in the root secret key in BBG-HIBE. In the set up phase of our proof, the secret information of Y t+1 has to be included into all components in the root secret key. If the secret information of Y t+1 is included into only a target-level-h * component, which naturally corresponds to the proof on BBG-HIBE, the proof would fail.
In the challenge phase of our proof, the challenger makes ciphertext to v * and the designated level h * , where v * might be appended random elements by B at the initialization phase. However, the attacker A cannot distinguish the cipher text to (his intention) v * with the level h * from that to (B's appended) v * with the level h * since the cipher text can be decrypted by SK v * | h with (his intention) v * and the cipher text itself is a random number. The same logic is used in the proof on BBG-HIBE. Chosen Ciphertext Security. An efficient general method of constructing an IND-sID-CCA-secure HIBE from IND-sID-CPA-secure HIBE is proposed 4) . Applying the construction to our AE-HIBE results in IND-sAE-HIBE-CCA secure with the constant size ciphertext. Table 2 summarizes the efficiency of AE-HIBE compared with BBG-HIBE. AE-HIBE realizes ID-based encryption with a hierarchical structure without any additional computation or memory cost, that is the performance of AE-HIBE is the same as that of BBG-HIBE. Therefore, AE-HIBE realizes the constant-size ciphertext and decryption time in the same way as BBG-HIBE and even reduces the encryption time of BBG-HIBE by designating ancestors with a level > 1 as receivers with a right of decryption.
Efficiency

Application
This section applies our AE-HIBE to the broadcast encryption. After briefly reviewing known facts on a public-key broadcast encryption, we reconsider a general model of subsetdifference broadcast encryption and present a generic model based on AE-HIBE. channel, in which a set of privileged users may be changed by each digital content. Let N be the set of all users with |N | = N and R be the set of all revoked users with |R| = r. Then privileged users are in N \R. The formal definition is given as follows.
Known Facts on Broadcast Encryption Broadcast encryption distributes digital contents to subscribers by using an open broadcast
Definition 6 (Broadcast encryption) Broadcast encryption consists of a 3-tuple of ppt algorithms (BE-Ini, BE-Enc, BE-Dec):
• BE-Ini(1 k , t, N ), the initialization algorithm, for input of the security parameter 1 k and a set of users N with |N | = N = 2 t , outputs a system public parameter PK which includes two encryption algorithms E 1 for session keys and E 2 for messages, a family S = {S i } of subsets of N , the master's secret key SK which can compute all subset keys of S, and a secret key K u for a user u ∈ N .
• BE-Enc(PK, N \ R, S, K, M), the encryption algorithm, for input of the public parameter PK, a set of privileged users N \R, a family S of sets, a session key K, and a message M , covers N \ R = ∪ j S i j by disjoint subsets {S i j } j and encrypts the session key K and the message M with each subset key K S i j and K, respectively, to
where E i (K, M ) (i = 1, 2) means an encryption of M with a key K.
• BE-Dec(PK, K u , C), for input of a secret key K u of a user u, the public parameter PK, and a ciphertext C broadcasted by the center, finds a subset
The efficiency of public-key broadcast encryption depends on the transmission rate j |E 1 (K S i j , K)|, the size of a user secret key |K u |, and the size of user public keys. The number of subsets |S u | that a user u belongs to relates to the number of a user secret key.
Two specific examples of subset-cover framework, the complete subtree broadcast encryption (CS) and the subset difference broadcast encryption (SD), are proposed 10) . We focus on SD and improving the public-key SD. For the detailed explanation of CS and public-key CS, please refer to the original papers 6),10) . In SD, users are assigned to leaves of a binary tree T , where we assume that |N | = N = 2 t for the sake of simplicity. We call T the user tree. A privileged user is covered with a difference set of two subsets 
• One-way feature for a common primary root:
• It is difficult to compute SK v| h ,v without knowledge of any secret key
A secret key of a user u is set to
, which enables the user u to derive necessary subset key by using BE-KDer, which is assured by Eq. (2).
The public-key SD is realized by applying HIBE to the key derivation tree T KDT 6) . T KDT represents the inclusion relation in {S w,v } based on Eq. the case of 4 users, respectively.
Reconsideration of Public-key SD
Based on AE-HIBE In order to reduce |K u |, we further consider the next feature on a common secondary root:
Equation (3) 
The ancestor-excludable feature of AE-HIBE is perfectly suitable for this ancestor-designated feature for a common secondary root and can achieve the public-key SD more efficiently than the public-key based on HIBE. AE-HIBE does not need a key derivation tree T KDT associated with T and utilizes T to achieve the public-key SD.
Generic Construction of Publickey SD Based on AE-HIBE
We submit the generic construction of the public-key SD (BE-Ini, BE-Enc, BE-Dec) based on AE-HIBE (KGen, KDer, KDer p , Enc, Dec). BE-Ini(1 k , t, N ) executes the following: ( 1 ) Run KGen(1 k , t) and get outputs of PK and the root secret key SK ε . ( 2 ) Run KDer(PK, v, SK ε ) for v = v 1 · · · v l from l = 1 to t one by one and generate node secret keys {SK v } v∈T . ( 3 ) Set a user secret key K u as a set of secret keys of nodes just hanging off the 
to M , and output M . Table 3 compares performances of our construction and the previous constructions 6) , which are the public-key CS, SD, and LSD 8) .
The public-key LSD reduces the size of user keys of the public-key SD to O(|SK HIBE | log 3/2 N ) with the double size of the transmission rate of the public-key SD, which still keeps the same order of O(r|C HIBE |). Our novel ancestor-control feature of AE-HIBE can further reduce the size of user keys of the publickey LSD to O(|SK AE-HIBE | log N ) with half of the transmission rate. Table 1 compares concrete schemes of public-key broadcast encryptions, where our public-key SD uses our AE-HIBE; the public-key CS uses IBE 3) ; and the public-key SD and LSD use BBG-HIBE. We see that our public-key broadcast encryption based on AE-HIBE works with the smallest user-key size O(log 2 N ) while maintaining the constant public-key size and the transmission rate of O(r).
Conclusion
We have proposed a new concept of ancestorexcludable hierarchical ID-based encryption (AE-HIBE), which can exclude ancestors with a level less than the designated one from a set of privileged ancestors. We have also given the functional definition together with the security definition. We have presented the concrete example of AE-HIBE, which can work with constant-size ciphertext and decryption time, independent of the hierarchy level, and is proven to be selective-ID secure in the standard model. Furthermore, AE-HIBE can naturally achieve the efficient public-key SD broadcast encryption (SD) with the user-key size of O(log 2 N ) and the transmission rate of O(r) for N users and r revoked users, which is the best performance between the public-key LSD and SD based on BBG-HIBE and the public-key SD based on our AE-HIBE.
